In this paper we focus on games with a coalition structure. Particularly, we deal with the Owen value, the coalitional value of the Shapley value, and we provide a computational procedure to calculate this coalitional value in terms of the multilinear extension of the original game.
INTRODUCTION
Shapley (Shapley, 1953 ) (see also (Roth, 1988) and (Owen, 1995) ) initiated the value theory for cooperative games. The Shapley value applies without restrictions and provides, for every game, a single payoff vector to the players. The restriction of the value to simple games gives rise to the Shapley-Shubik power index (Shapley and Shubik, 1954) , that was axiomatized in (Dubey, 1975) introducing the transfer property. As a sort of reaction, Banzhaf (Banzhaf, 1965) proposed a different power index that Owen (Owen, 1975) extended to a dummy-independent and somehow "normalized" Banzhaf value for all cooperative games. A nice almost common characterization of the Shapley and Banzhaf values would be given in (Feltkamp, 1995) .
Games with a coalition structure were introduced in (Aumann and Drèze, 1974) , who extended the Shapley value to this new framework in such a manner that the game really splits into subgames played by the unions isolatedly from each other, and every player receives the payoff allocated by the restriction of the Shapley value to the subgame he is playing within his union. A second approach was used in (Owen, 1977) , when introducing and axiomatically characterizing his coalitional value (Owen value) . The Owen value is the result of a two-step procedure: first, the unions play a quotient game among themselves, and each one receives a payoff which, in turn, is shared among its players in an internal game. Both payoffs, in the quotient game for unions and within each union for its players, are given by applying the Shapley value. Further axiomatizations of the Owen value have been given in e.g. (Hart and Kurz, 1983) , (Peleg, 1989) , (Winter, 1992) , (Amer and Carreras, 1995) and (Amer and Carreras, 2001) , (Vázquez et al., 1997) , (Vázquez, 1998) , (Hamiache, 1999) , (Hamiache, 2001) and (Albizuri, 2002) .
Owen applied the same procedure to the Banzhaf value and obtained the modified Banzhaf value or Owen-Banzhaf value (Owen, 1982) . In this case the payoffs at both levels (unions in the quotient game and players within each union) are given by the Banzhaf value.
Alonso and Fiestras suggested to modify the twostep allocation scheme and use the Banzhaf value for sharing in the quotient game and the Shapley value within unions. This gave rise to the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value or Alonso-Fiestras value (Alonso and Fiestras, 2002) . That same year, Carreras et al. considered a sort of "counterpart" of the Alonso-Fiestras value where the Shapley value is used in the quotient game and the Banzhaf value within unions (Amer et al., 2002) . Thus, the possibilities to define a coalitional value by combining the Shapley and Banzhaf values were complete at that moment.
In 1972 Owen introduced the multilinear extension (Owen, 1972) and applied it to the calculus of the Shapley value. The computing technique based on the multilinear extension has been applied to many values: in 1975 to the Banzhaf value (Owen, 1975) ; in 1992 to the Owen value (Owen and Winter, 1992) ; in 1994 to the Owen-Banzhaf value (Carreras and Magaña, 1994) ; in 1997 to the quotient game (Carreras and Magaña, 1997) ; in 2000 to binomial semivalues and to multinomial probabilistic indices (Puente, 2000) ; in 2004 to the α-decisiveness and Banzhaf α-indices (Carreras, 2004) ; in 2005 to the Alonso-Fiestras value (Alonso et al., 2005) ; in 2011 to symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues (Carreras and Puente, 2011) ; in 2011 to semivalues (Carreras and Giménez, 2011) ; in 2015 to coalitional multinomial probabilistic values (Carreras and Puente, 2015) .
The present paper focus on giving a new computational procedure for the Owen value by means of the multilinear extension of the game.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, a minimum of preliminaries is provided. Section 3 is devoted to give a procedure to compute the Owen value.
PRELIMINARIES

Cooperative Games
Let N be a finite set of players and 2 N be the set of its coalitions (subsets of N). A cooperative game on N is a function v : 2 N → R, that assigns a real number
Given a nonempty coalition T ⊆ N, the restriction to T of a given game v on N is the game v |T on T that we will call a subgame of v and is defined by v |T (S) = v(S) for all S ⊆ T .
Endowed with the natural operations for realvalued functions, i.e. v + v and λv for all λ ∈ R, the set of all cooperative games on N is a vector space G N . For every nonempty coalition T ⊆ N, the unanimity game u T is defined by u T (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S and u T (S) = 0 otherwise, and it is easily checked that the set of all unanimity games is a basis for G N , so that
By a value on G N we will mean a map f :
Well known example of value is the Shapley value ϕ (Shapley (Shapley, 1953) ), defined as
for all i ∈ N, v ∈ G N , where s = |S| and p s = 1/n n−1 s . Notice that this value is defined for each N. In fact, it is defined on cardinalities rather than on specific player sets: this means the weighting vector {p s } n−1 s=0 defines the Shapley value on all N such that n = |N|. When necessary, we shall write ϕ (n) for the Shapley value on cardinality n and p n s for its weighting coefficients. ϕ (n) induces values ϕ (t) for all cardinalities t < n, recurrently defined by the Pascal triangle (inverse) formula given by Dragan (Dragan, 1997) 
The multilinear extension (Owen, 1972 ) of a game v ∈ G N is the real-valued function defined on
where X N denotes the set of variables x i for i ∈ N.
As is well known, both the Shapley and Banzhaf values of any game v can be easily obtained from its multilinear extension. Indeed, ϕ [v] can be calculated by integrating the partial derivatives of the multilinear extension of the game along the main diagonal Owen, 1972) ), while the partial derivatives of that multilinear extension evaluated at point (1/2, 1/2, . . . , 1/2) give β[v] (Owen, 1975) .
Games with Coalition Structure
Given N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, we will denote by B(N) the set of all partitions of N. If f is a value on G N and g is a coalitional value on G cs N , it is said that g is a coalitional value of f iff
The Owen Value
The Owen value (Owen (Owen, 1977) ) is the coalitional value Φ defined by 
This coalitional value was axiomatically characterized by Owen (Owen, 1977) as the only coalitional value that satisfies the following properties: the natural extensions to this framework of
• efficiency • additivity • the dummy player property and also
• symmetry within unions:
• symmetry in the quotient game:
Finally, as Φ is defined for any N, the following property makes sense and is also satisfied:
The Owen value can be viewed as a two-step allocation rule. First, each union B k receives its payoff in the quotient game according to the Shapley value; then, each B k splits this amount among its players by applying the Shapley value to a game played in B k as follows: the worth of each subcoalition T of B k is the Shapley value that T would get in a "pseudoquotient game" played by T and the remaining unions on the assumption that B k \T leaves the game, i.e. the quotient game after replacing B k with T . This is the way to bargain within the union: each subcoalition T claims the payoff it would obtain when dealing with the other unions in absence of its partners in B k .
The Owen value is a coalitional value of the Shapley value ϕ in the sense that Φ[v;
A COMPUTATIONAL PROCEDURE TO CALCULATE THE OWEN VALUE
In this section we present a new computational procedure to calculate this coalitional value. Before that, we need two previous results that will be given in Lemma 3.1 and Proposition 3.2.
Lemma 3.1. Let [v; B] ∈ G cs N , B = {B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B m } a coalition structure in N. The allocations given by Φ to players belonging to a union B j can be obtained as a linear combination of the allocations to unanimity games u T , where T = V ∪W , V ⊆ B j and W ∈ 2 B\B j .
.
Proof Each game v ∈ G N can be uniquely written as linear combination of unanimity games
where
By linearity, for all i ∈ B j ,
and it suffices consider unanimity games u T with
According to the definition of the Owen value it is easy to check that the allocations to players in B j only depend on the allocations in the unanimity games defined on inside coalitions in B j and entire unions outside B j . That is,
Notice that the number of unanimity games of this form is (2 b j − 1)2 m with b j = |B j | and m = |M|. Proposition 3.2. Let B = {B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B m } be a coalition structure in N. Fixed a union B j , the allocation to a player i belonging to B j in a unanimity game
where (p Proof For i ∈ T we have
where Q = r∈R B r , b j = |B j |, and s = |S|.
Example 3.1 On the players set N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, let B = {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5}, {6}} be a coalition structure on N. We will obtain the allocations to players i ∈ B 1 according to Φ for the unanimity games u {1,2,4,6} and u {1,2,4,5,6} . They are In a similar way and according to Lemma 3.1, for u {1,2,4,5,6} we obtain 2,4,5,6} ; B] = p Notice that the allocations in both games are the same because coalitions {1, 2, 4, 6} and {1, 2, 4, 5, 6} intersect the same unions B 2 and B 3 .
In next theorem we present a new method to compute the Owen value by means of the multilinear extension of the game. 1. Obtain the multilinear extension f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) of game v. 2. For every r = j and all h ∈ B r , replace the variable x h with y r . This yields a new function of x k for k ∈ B j and y r for r ∈ M\{ j}.
3. In this new function, reduce to 1 all higher exponents, i.e. replace with y r each y q r such that q > 1. This gives a new multilinear function denoted as g j ((x k ) k∈B j , (y r ) r∈M\{ j} ) (The modified multilinear extension of union B j ). 4. After some calculus, the obtained modified multilinear extension reduces to 
Proof Steps 1-3 have been already used in many well known works to obtain the modified multilinear extension of union B j .
Step 4 shows the modified multilinear extension as a linear combination of multilinear extensions of unanimity games.
Step 5 weights each unanimity game according to Proposition 3.2 so that step 6 gives as usual the marginal contribution of player i and his allocation Φ i [v; B] is obtained. [68; 50, 21, 20, 19, 13, 9, 3] be the 7-person weighted majority game and the coalition structure B = {{1}, {2, 3, 5}, {4}, {6}, {7}}. We will compute Φ[v; B].
The set of minimal winning coalitions of the game is
so that players 2, 3 and 4 on one hand, and 5 and 6 on the other, are symmetric in v. Moreover, player 7 is null and the multilinear extension of v is
+x 1 x 5 x 6 + x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 − x 1 x 2 x 5 x 6 − x 1 x 3 x 5 x 6 −x 1 x 4 x 5 x 6 + x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 + x 2 x 3 x 4 x 6 − x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 −x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 6 + x 1 x 2 x 3 x 5 x 6 + x 1 x 2 x 4 x 5 x 6 +x 1 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 − x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 . The coalition structure is B = {{1}, {2, 3, 5}, {4}, {6}, {7}}
and steps 1-4 in Theorem 3.3 give the modified multilinear extension of each union B j , for j = 1, 2, 3, 4 (notice that player 7 is null in v and it is not necessary to compute g 5 ).
g 1 (x 1 , y 2 , y 3 , y 4 , y 5 ) = x 1 y 2 + x 1 y 3 − 2x 1 y 2 y 3 + y 2 y 3 , g 2 (x 2 , x 3 , x 5 , y 1 , y 3 , y 4 , y 5 ) = x 2 y 1 + x 3 y 1 + y 1 y 3 − x 2 x 3 y 1 − x 2 y 1 y 3 − x 3 y 1 y 3 + x 5 y 1 y 4 + x 2 x 3 y 1 y 3 − x 2 x 5 y 1 y 4 − x 3 x 5 y 1 y 4 − x 5 y 1 y 3 y 4 + x 2 x 3 x 5 y 3 + x 2 x 3 y 3 y 4 − x 2 x 3 x 5 y 1 y 3 − x 2 x 3 y 1 y 3 y 4 + x 2 x 3 x 5 y 1 y 4 + x 2 x 5 y 1 y 3 y 4 + x 3 x 5 y 1 y 3 y 4 − x 2 x 3 x 5 y 3 y 4 , g 3 (x 4 , y 1 , y 2 , y 4 , y 5 ) = y 1 y 2 + x 4 y 1 + x 4 y 2 − 2x 4 y 1 y 2 , g 4 (x 6 , y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , y 5 ) = y 1 y 2 + y 1 y 3 + y 2 y 3 − 2y 1 y 2 y 3 .
Step 5 leads to g j for each j = 1, 2, 3, 4. 
